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The relationship between attachment theory and psychoanalysis, historically, has not 
been an easy one (Cassidy & Shaver, 2008; Eagle, 2013; Fonagy, 2001). But in recent years, 
developments in both fields have led to a growing rapprochement (Eagle, 2013; Holmes, 
2009). Changes in psychoanalytic thinking have made it more accommodating of attachment 
thinking; conversely, aspects of the development of attachment findings, applications, and 
theory have made it more pertinent to psychoanalysis. 
In this chapter we examine the disagreements between psychoanalysis and attachment 
theory, and point to some of the two disciplines’ common foundations. We then describe an 
approach to the role of attachment in human development that considers it in relation to the 
capacity to mentalize, that is, to understand ourselves and others in terms of intentional 
mental states, and places both attachment and mentalizing in the context of the development 
of epistemic trust—the capacity to trust others as a source of knowledge about the world. 
This approach builds on some of Bowlby’s assumptions drawn from evolutionary biology, 
placing some of the better founded psychoanalytic criticisms of attachment theory in a 
different perspective. We suggest that this context allows the ongoing significance of Bowlby 
and Ainsworth’s thinking for the psychoanalytic project to be appreciated.  
Traditional Psychoanalytic Developmental Theory and Attachment Theory:  
More Different Than Alike? 
In his biography of Bowlby, Holmes (1993) identified four points of disagreement 
with psychoanalysis: (1) the psychoanalytic emphasis on the patient’s internal phantasies at 
the expense of environmental influences and the patient’s real, lived experiences; (2) what 
Bowlby perceived as the spirit of rigid dogmatism within the psychoanalytic world, which 
was at odds with intellectual creativity and scientific enquiry; (3) psychoanalytic 
metapsychology, which Bowlby considered to be a speculative approach to understanding the 
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human mind which is not open to empirical verification; and (4) the lack of empirical 
observation to underpin psychoanalytic theories. 
Through his focus on the measurable and on the child’s environment, Bowlby 
demanded causal clarity and an epistemological refinement of psychoanalytic thinking. The 
adoption of an empirical approach to clarifying and examining the validity of psychoanalytic 
ideas is still controversial within the clinical psychoanalytic tradition (Aron, 2012; Hoffman, 
2009; Stern, 2013), although certain strands within psychoanalysis have taken a more positive 
approach to empirical research (Luyten, Blatt, & Corveleyn, 2006; Luyten, Blatt, Van 
Houdenhove, & Corveleyn, 2006).  
Bowlby’s ethological approach raised considerable challenges for the psychoanalytic 
position. Attachment was depicted by Bowlby as a form of behavior that the infant adapts 
according to environmental stimuli. The reflexive, flatly uniform quality that derived from an 
evolutionary and ethological perspective on attachment seemed starkly opposed to the 
humanism of the psychoanalytic impulse to recognize and engage with the complexity of 
individual subjectivity (Chused, 2012; Quinodoz, 1996). 
Attachment was also at odds with traditional drive-oriented psychoanalytic theory, 
which posited that the first few weeks and months of an infant’s life were almost solely 
characterized by drive discharge. Hence, drives were seen as primary; objects (i.e., 
attachment figures) were seen as secondary (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Objects entered 
the scene only because of the failure of pure primary process functioning, when hallucinatory 
wish-fulfilments (e.g., imagining the mother’s breast) failed to yield real gratification, which 
secondarily generated social awareness and engagement (Freud, 1915). This view could not 
be reconciled with Bowlby’s insistence on the primacy of attachment relationships, their 
evolutionary functions, and, by implication, the fact that infants were fundamentally and from 
the beginning of life positively oriented towards others.  
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Finally, attachment theory was accused of neglecting the developmental role of 
sexuality and aggression, which are seen as the central human urges in traditional 
psychoanalysis, responsible for continuous internal conflict and justifying defensive 
operations (Meissner, 2009). In contrast to the psychoanalytic understanding of human nature 
and relationships in terms of conflict and compromise (Geyskens, 2003), attachment theory 
appeared to reduce human relationships to a smooth evolutionary pre-wired unfolding 
process. Thus, particularly in Neo-Freudian and Lacanian circles, adopting attachment theory 
would mean a betrayal of fundamental hard-fought insights into the nature of human 
development (Symons, 2008; Widlocher & Fairfield, 2004; Zamanian, 2011).  
The Response of Major Psychoanalytic Thinkers 
Predictably, given the major differences in assumptions about the fundamentals of 
development, attachment theory met with fierce resistance from the psychoanalytic 
community.  
Bowlby’s focus on the impact of the lived reality of the child’s early emotional 
experiences, normally in relation to the mother, has distinct parallels with Winnicott’s 
recognition of the significance of the early caring environment. However, Winnicott, one of 
the best-known psychoanalytic developmentalists, was unhappy with Bowlby’s use of 
ethology and the statistical approach at the expense of the clinical case study, and was 
concerned about the loss of the complexity of individual subjectivity (Abram, 2008). Thus, 
although in retrospect we might locate Bowlby’s work within the object relations school of 
psychoanalytic thinking, with both Bowlby and Winnicott emphasizing the significance of 
the relationship between infant and caregiver, this was not straightforwardly perceived as a 
shared intellectual project (Keller, 2011). 
Anna Freud, one of the great psychoanalysts of Bowlby’s era, was also one of the first 
psychoanalysts to adopt a coherent developmental perspective on psychopathology. She 
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argued that psychological disorder is most effectively studied in its developmental evolution, 
asserting that it is the profile or pattern among different developmental lines that best 
captures the nature of the risk faced by the individual child. This view foreshadowed and laid 
part of the foundation of contemporary developmental psychopathology (Cicchetti, 2013). 
Anna Freud’s developmental lines included, for instance, the line from dependency to self-
reliance to adult object relations, so central in attachment theory. But her theory was broader 
and also included the line from irresponsibility to responsibility in body management, the line 
from egocentrism to social partnership, and so forth. Unevenness of development was 
considered a risk factor, and treatment in certain cases adopted the modified aim of restoring 
the child to the path of normal development (developmental help) (Midgley, 2012).  
Despite their shared emphasis on development, Anna Freud was deeply 
unsympathetic to attachment theory. And, despite her own observations to the contrary, in her 
theoretical writings Anna Freud based the child’s early relationship with the mother on sexual 
instinctual needs, in line with traditional drive theory. Although she was well aware of 
unevenness in ego development, she rarely saw this as caused by relationship disturbance. 
While her clinical focus and interventions were to a marked extent focused on optimizing the 
social context of the child, her theoretical writings appeared to be constrained by an 
adherence to classical psychoanalytical ideas (Young-Bruehl, 2011). 
Melanie Klein was the third great thinker who shaped the psychoanalytic milieu 
within and against which Bowlby worked. Klein’s disagreements with Anna Freud have been 
well-documented (Gabbard & Scarfone, 2002); their shared suspicion of attachment theory 
was perhaps one of the few things that united them. Klein was one of the founders of the 
object relations school, which, with its conception that subjective experience shapes one’s 
behavior and relationships, considerably narrowed the gap between attachment theory and 
psychoanalysis (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). The relationship between Klein and Bowlby’s 
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thinking was both intimate and highly adversarial, and the points of contact are worth 
examining because of the great influence of Kleinian thinking on contemporary 
psychoanalysis (e.g. Brown, 2011).  
Klein saw mental structures as arising out of a variety of internal objects (phantasies 
about people in the infant's life), which change in character as the child develops from 
infancy. The infant’s phantasies are modified by actual experiences of interaction with the 
environment. Bowlby was deeply influenced by Kleinian thought, and traces of his training 
and experience in the British Psychoanalytic Society, which was predominantly Kleinian, can 
be readily identified in his writings. For example, his focus on the first year of life as a crucial 
determinant of later developmental outcomes is highly compatible with the Kleinian 
approach. Perhaps most important is the intimate connection that both bodies of work 
envision between emotional experiences and the cognitive apparatus underpinning thought. 
This is expressed most clearly in the last volume of Bowlby’s trilogy (1980) and in Bion’s 
(1997) elaboration of Klein’s ideas. Even in opposition, many of Bowlby’s ideas were 
reactions against the Kleinian influence on him.  
One of Bowlby's central objections to Kleinian psychoanalytic theory was its neglect 
of actual experience and the assumption that a child's anxieties arise predominantly from 
constitutional tendencies, such as innate (i.e., drive-related) aggression (Klein, 1936). 
However, recent post-Kleinian psychoanalysts have been quite successful at integrating 
environmental accounts with Klein’s ideas (e.g., Ferro, 2006). The child’s capacity to cope 
with the pain and anxiety of the depressive position, seeing himself or herself as destructive 
and envious, is now generally attributed in more contemporary Kleinian views to external as 
well as constitutional factors (Vermote, 2011).  
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Areas of Integration between Psychoanalysis and Attachment Theory 
Several trends within psychoanalysis have paved the way for a rapprochement with 
attachment theory. For a start, psychoanalysis has become more pluralistic and accepting of 
differences (Holmes, 2009). The emergence of a relational and relationship-focused emphasis 
in modern psychoanalysis has also led to increasing interest in the formative nature of the 
child’s social environment, and object relations theory has played a pivotal role in this 
context (Aron & Leichich, 2011; Brown, 2010; Epstein, 2010). In this section we will 
consider more closely some of the most important areas of integration between 
psychoanalysis and attachment theory. 
The Internal Working Model 
Bowlby’s attachment theory, like classical psychoanalysis, has a biological focus (see 
especially Bowlby, 1969). Bowlby’s critical contribution was his unwavering focus on the 
infant’s need for an unbroken (secure) early attachment to the mother. He emphasized the 
survival value of attachment in enhancing safety through proximity to the caregiver in 
addition to feeding, learning about the environment and social interaction, and protection 
from predators. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, psychoanalysts were horrified by this apparently simplistic 
approach, which bore the hallmarks of the worst excesses of behaviorist reductionism. 
However, in the second volume of Attachment and Loss, Bowlby established the set goal of 
the attachment system as maintaining the caregiver’s accessibility and responsiveness, which 
he covered with a single term: “availability” (Bowlby, 1973, p. 202). This availability 
translates into the confident expectation, gained from “tolerably accurately” (Bowlby, 1973, 
p. 202) represented experience, over a significant time period, that the attachment figure will 
be available. The attachment behavioral system thus came to be underpinned by a set of 
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representational models or, following the pioneering psychologist Craik (1943), internal 
working models (IWMs; see Bretherton & Munholland, Chapter xx, this volume).  
The positing of a representational system underpinning attachment permitted a far 
more sophisticated consideration of individual differences (Bowlby, 1973, 1980). Given the 
power of the biological forces driving the human attachment system, Bowlby assumed that 
almost all human beings will become attached. The concept of the disorganization of the 
attachment system was not yet available (Main & Solomon, 1986); for Bowlby, attachment 
could be only secure or insecure. Secure attachment implied a representational system in 
which the attachment figure was seen as accessible and responsive when needed. Anxious 
attachment implied a somewhat dysfunctional system in which the caregiver’s responsiveness 
was not assumed and the child adopted strategies for circumventing his or her perceived 
unresponsiveness (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978).   
Thus, the central feature of the IWM concerned the infant’s encoding interactions in 
terms of what they implied about the expected availability of the attachment figure. Bowlby 
also envisioned a complementary working model of the self. The key feature of this was how 
acceptable or unacceptable the child felt in the eyes of the attachment figure. A child whose 
IWM of the caregiver was focused on rejection was expected to evolve a complementary 
working model of the self as unlovable, unworthy, and flawed. Although not explicitly stated 
by Bowlby, these models of the attachment figure and the self were somewhat transactional, 
interactive models representing self–other relationships. The explanatory power of Bowlby’s 
model rested in his proposal that these encoded expectations were capable of providing 
prototypes for all later close relationships.  
Bowlby’s original concept has been elaborated by some of the greatest minds in the 
attachment field (see Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). Through the working model, Bowlby 
created a wider theory about the construction of the psyche, which is sometimes under-
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represented in the more schematic portrayals of attachment theory. In Loss, for instance, 
Bowlby described how an individual defensively excludes stimuli that are incompatible with 
the IWM, leading to an inability to accommodate external reality, often in relation to other 
people’s emotional states or attachment needs. This led to a new take by Bowlby on 
repression and dissociative phenomena (the kind of territory more normally associated with 
psychoanalytic thinking), which are often the result of deactivation of the attachment system 
(Dykas & Cassidy, 2011)—most notably in a disorganized individual dealing with grief or 
bereavement (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). 
The concept of the IWM was key to the rapprochement with psychoanalytic object 
relations theory and psychoanalysis more generally (e.g., Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997; 
Wachtel, 2009, 2010). This so-called “move to the level of representation” (Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985) was elaborated by Main and colleagues and has had enormous influence, 
particularly via the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI). Main’s work (Main, Hesse, & Hesse, 
2011; Main et al., 1985) reconceptualized individual differences in attachment organization 
as individual differences in the mental representation of the self in relation to attachment; it 
enabled the examination of attachment in older children and adults.   
Object Relations 
The notion of IWMs is consistent with psychoanalytic object relations theory’s 
emphasis on the central role of self and object representations in development (Blatt et al., 
1997; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Kernberg & Caligor, 2005). In both perspectives, 
representations of self and others are seen as the fundamental building blocks of normal and 
disrupted development, with representations of self and others becoming increasingly 
integrated, differentiated, and positive in normal development. Fairbairn’s (Fairbairn, 1952, 
1963) simple insight that people are fundamentally driven by relationships and their need for 
them, and that the pursuit of relationships is not a secondary by-product of the primary drives 
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for gratification described by Freud, is in essence highly congruent with Bowlby’s insight in 
relation to the biological priority of the “secure base.” For both attachment theory and object 
relations theory, it is axiomatic that the infant’s psyche, his or her relationship 
representational structure, is shaped by early relationship experiences. As the object relations 
model replaced ego psychology as a dominant international psychoanalytic paradigm, 
attachment theory’s emphasis on the innate need for a relationship came to be embraced by a 
majority.   
Psychopathology, from these perspectives, is seen as reflecting impairments in the 
structure and content of mental representations of self and others (e.g., Blatt, 1974; Westen, 
1991). This led to a burgeoning research literature (Huprich & Greenberg, 2003; Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2007) that uses concepts denoting very similar constructs, but often with 
somewhat different names, ranging from object representations (Brinich, 1980) to cognitive 
affective schemas of self and others (self–object–affect triads) (Kernberg, 2014), role 
responsiveness (Sandler & Sandler, 1998), representations of interactions that have been 
generalized (RIGs) (Stern, 1985), and IWMs (Blatt et al., 1997). The strong psychometric 
contributions of attachment research were recognized and further developed by 
psychoanalytic researchers. In particular, the links between the adult attachment construct 
and object relations patterns of self–other representation have been carefully studied (Blatt et 
al., 1997; Loeffler-Stastka & Blueml, 2010; Luyten & Blatt, 2013; Priel & Besser, 2001).  
Attachment theory’s emphasis on an autonomous need for a relationship has not gone 
completely unchallenged within psychoanalysis (e.g., Geyskens, 2003; Green, 2005; 
Widlocher & Fairfield, 2004), However, the embarrassment caused by the apparently 
endemic neglect of childhood maltreatment (Masson, 1984; Simon, 1992) has been followed 
by an embrace of the trauma concept and the role of early relationships more broadly (e.g., 
Levine, 2014; Person & Klar, 1994). More generally, the emergence and dominance of object 
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relations theory in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to increasing psychoanalytic recognition 
of the formative nature of the child’s external, social environment. Engaging with the 
psychological consequences of childrearing patterns characteristic of families with serious 
social disadvantages has forced psychoanalysts to rethink the concept of trauma (e.g., 
Bohleber, 2007), bringing their conceptualization closer to attachment formulations (Allen, 
Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008).  
Yet, as noted, not everyone agrees, and it is striking that with the growing popularity 
of attachment and object relations theory, interest in sexuality in psychoanalysis has declined 
significantly (Fonagy, 2008). This has happened despite the fact that sexuality, along with 
aggression, remains one of the most problematic human experiences, as evidenced by the role 
of sexuality and aggression in a variety of psychological problems and disorders (Fonagy & 
Luyten, in press; Zamanian, 2011). With some exceptions (e.g., Kernberg, 2012), the 
integration of attachment theory with a comprehensive theory of human sexuality and 
aggression remains to be developed (see Birnbaum, Chapter xx, this volume).  
Relational and Relationship-Focused Psychoanalysis 
The 1980s saw the beginning of an integration of relational approaches augmented 
and modified by the intersubjectivist vision of philosophically oriented psychoanalysts such 
as Stolorow (1997) and infant researchers such as Emde (Emde, Kubicek, & Oppenheim, 
1997). This interpersonal relationship-focused perspective is perhaps best exemplified by the 
so-called relational school, partly rooted in the work of Sullivan (Benjamin, 1998; Bromberg, 
1998; Mitchell & Aron, 1999; Sullivan, 1953). The theory is more of an orientation than a 
coherent body of ideas, and many theoreticians and clinicians who emphasize relational 
issues do not necessarily identify themselves as “relational psychoanalysts.” Yet, relational 
psychoanalysis combines the concerns of modern psychoanalysis with the traditional 
concerns of attachment theory. It emerged as psychoanalysis moved toward the 
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developmental framework established within attachment theory and other dynamic 
psychological approaches rooted in observing early development. Psychodynamic therapists 
who wish to embrace the relational approach often move toward an attachment model, albeit 
unwittingly (Cortina, 2001).  
The relational model assumes that subjectivity is interpersonal: that is, the 
intersubjective replaces the intrapsychic (Mitchell, 1988). This renders the individual human 
mind a contradiction in terms, since subjectivity is invariably rooted in an intersubjective 
matrix of relational bonds within which personal meanings are embedded (Mitchell, 2000), 
rather than in biological drives. Unlike most other psychoanalytic theories, the relational 
model lacks a specific explanation of how relationality and intersubjectivity develop. For this 
reason, attachment theory and conclusions drawn from the observation of attachment 
relationships may be helpful. 
Bowlby’s focus on child–caregiver interaction as the primary driver of social 
development makes him a quintessential relational theorist. Among others he influenced, 
Bowlby clearly influenced Trevarthen (e.g., Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001), who argues that 
infants are innately predisposed to social relationships and that primary intersubjectivity 
characterizes the mental experience of infants during infant–caregiver interactions 
(Trevarthen, 1993; Trevarthen, Aitken, Vandekerckhove, Delafield-Butt, & Nagy, 2006). In 
addition to a predisposition to relate, attachment theory posits and describes other 
adaptations—including defensive processes—that develop in the context of specifically 
elaborated relational processes, which themselves occur at the interface between infant 
distress and the caregiver’s response. That is, attachment theory, like relational theory, is a 
two-person theory of conflict and defense, which sees defenses as arising from the conflict 
between the infant’s needs and the caregiver’s responses (Lyons-Ruth, 1999, 2003). 
The hypothesis of procedural representations of implicit relational knowing raises the 
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theory of internal object relations to a more general “systems” conception. The implicit 
relational knowing of two partners or of a patient and an analyst will be altered by moments 
of meeting—by the enactment of a new potential that will come to be represented as a future 
possibility. The best-documented forms of procedural implicit relational knowing are 
displayed during the first 2 years of life, when interactions are registered in representations of 
interpersonal events in a nonsymbolic form. The unique configuration of adaptive strategies 
that emerges from the attachment relationship constitutes the initial organization of the 
child’s domain of implicit relational knowing (IWMs, proto-narrative envelopes, themes of 
organization, relational scripts).  
In general, both attachment theorists and interpersonalists are reluctant to privilege 
fantasy over actuality. Interpersonal and intrapsychic factors are seen as equally important. 
Sullivan’s break from traditional psychoanalysis mirrors Bowlby’s conflict with the British 
psychoanalytic community: Bowlby shared an emphasis on dyadic relationships with 
interpersonalists, but he also shared with Sullivan (1964) an interest in observable behavior. 
Neither Bowlby nor Sullivan could specifically be labeled “behaviorist,” but they shared a 
systematic interest in what happens between people. For Sullivan, this entailed a detailed 
inquiry into who said what to whom, whereas Bowlby’s focus was on what happened in the 
past to explain the present.  
Current relational thinking often uses psychopathological accounts of trauma to 
highlight the relational aspects of actual experience (e.g., Davies, 1996). “What really 
happened” is combined with attention to the patient’s subjective experience, not in order to 
separate veridical events from distortions associated with unconscious fantasy, but rather to 
elaborate the overwhelming nature of the experience itself—especially because the context of 
trauma is assumed to preclude awareness of its meanings (Pizer, 2003). It is the inherent 
paradox of attachment trauma that a stance of “not knowing what one knows” (Bowlby, 
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1988, p. 99) may be adopted to keep the crucial relationship intact. Relational psychoanalytic 
(Stern, 1997) and attachment-inspired (Hesse & Main, 2006) clinical descriptions provide 
similar formulations of dissociation linked with traumatic experience. 
The Self Psychology Tradition 
The emergence of self psychology from the work of Heinz Kohut (1971) has, like attachment 
theory, contributed to focusing psychoanalytic interest on the earliest phases of development. 
Self psychology grew out of the increasing dominance of object relations theory, but because 
its origins were in North America it was less affected by the Kleinian focus on aggression and 
destructiveness. The work of Kohut revolutionized North American psychoanalysis in the last 
decades of the 20th century. Kohut broke the iron grip of ego psychology by forcing 
psychoanalysts to think in less mechanistic terms—in terms of selfhood rather than 
psychological function and selfobjects rather than the drive gratification provided by the 
object.  
Self psychology holds empathy to be central in both development and therapy 
(Ornstein, 2008); without it we would not have access to the world of the other. Empathy is a 
process that emerges between two or more people when their interaction creates the 
possibility of a world of meanings based on mutual understanding, and empathy generates a 
sense of connection through dialogue (Orange, 2009). The seminal contribution of Kohut 
(1971, 1977; Kohut & Wolf, 1978), at least in the context of this chapter, lies in his 
innovative suggestion that the development of narcissism (originally self-love or self-esteem) 
has its own developmental path, and that caregiving individuals (objects) serve special 
functions along this line of development, as selfobjects that evoke the experience of selfhood. 
Empathic responses from the selfobject facilitate the unfolding of infantile grandiosity and 
encourage feelings of omnipotence, which enable the building of an idealized image of the 
parent with whom the child wishes to merge. This “transmuting internalization of the 
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mirroring function” gradually leads to a consolidation of a nuclear self (Kohut & Wolf, 
1978,’ pp. 414–416). The idealization of the selfobject leads to the development of ideals. At 
the opposite pole of this ‘bipolar self’ is a representation of natural talents gained through the 
mirroring function. Selfobjects continue to be needed throughout life, to some degree, to 
sustain self-cohesion (Kohut, 1984). Kohut’s self psychology relies on the notion of 
attachment as a central motivation for the establishment and maintenance of self-
cohesiveness (Shane, Shane, & Gales, 1997). Like Bowlby, Kohut replaced the dual drives of 
classical analysis with a relational construct. Like Winnicott, he linked self-development with 
mirroring or maternal sensitivity. And like attachment theorists, he reversed the relationship 
of drives and self-structure, regarding the self as superordinate and drive conflicts as 
indications of “an enfeebled self” (Kohut, 1977).  
Unlike attachment theorists, however, self psychologists view the cohesion of the self 
as the primary motivation guiding human behavior rather than as a biologically predefined 
relationship pattern. Kohut separated anxiety about object loss from anxiety about 
disintegration of the self. For self psychology, the root of anxiety is the self’s experience of a 
defect, a lack of cohesiveness and continuity (Cohler & Weiner, 2011). This subtle but 
important shift of emphasis relegates the attachment figure to second place.  
It is also difficult to identify within attachment theory a concept analogous to 
grandiosity or omnipotence as naturally occurring in infant development. The notion of 
infantile omnipotence is certainly challenged by findings indicating that on the majority of 
occasions the infant is not able to elicit synchronous (mirroring) behavior from the mother 
(Tronick, 2007). Although infants undoubtedly enjoy experiences of mastery (Rochat, 2009), 
there is no evidence that this leads to a sense of omnipotence. It seems far more likely that we 
are once more encountering the problematic tendency of psychoanalytic thinkers to describe 
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infant behavior in terms of adultomorphic constructs. This is the very problem Bowlby's 
entire theoretical effort aimed to address. 
Developmental Research and Attachment 
The work of Daniel Stern (1985) bridged the gulf between infant researchers and 
psychoanalysts in a highly successful and productive way. His primary concern was with the 
development of self structure. He distinguished four stages of early formation of the self: (1) 
the sense of emergent self (0–2 months) involves the process of the self 's coming into being 
and forming initial connections; (2) the sense of core self and the domain of core relatedness 
(2–6 months) are based on the single organizing subjective perspective and a coherent 
physical self; (3) the sense of subjective self and the domain of intersubjective relatedness (7–
15 months) emerge with the discovery of subjective mental states beyond physical events; 
and (4) the sense of verbal self forms after 15 months. 
Stern (1985, 1994) described three types of relationships of self-with-other: (a) self–
other complementing, (b) state sharing, and (c) state transforming. Although these 
relationships can be characterized by the degree of attachment or separateness they imply, it 
is their contribution to structuring the self through the schematization of experience that 
interested Stern. Stern’s most important point of contact with attachment theory is probably 
in the elaboration of the IWM. His starting point is the “emerging moment,” which is the 
subjective integration of all aspects of lived experience. The “moment” takes its input from 
emotions, behaviors, sensations, and all other aspects of the internal and external world from 
schematic representations of various types (e.g., event representations, semantic 
representations or conceptual schemas, perceptual schemas, and sensorimotor 
representations). He adds two further modes of representations: “feeling shapes” and “proto-
narrative envelopes.” These schemas form a network, which he terms “the schema of a-way-
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of-being-with.” The schema of a-way-of-being-with is conceptualized by Stern (Stern, 1998) 
from the assumed subjective perspective of the infant in interaction with the caregiver.  
The infant organizes his or her experience around a motive and a goal. The goals are 
not only biological, but include object relatedness (Fairbairn), affect states (Kernberg), states 
of self-esteem (Kohut), and safety (Sandler), as well as the gratification of physical needs, 
whether hunger, thirst, sexuality, or aggression. Stern’s theory elaborates Winnicott's (1971): 
Attunement satisfies the infant's need for omnipotence, while the caregiver’s capacity to 
accept protest without retaliation or anxiety allows the child to have confidence in the 
caregiver as resilient to the infant's attacks. 
Stern’s framework has much to offer attachment theory, particularly in terms of the 
careful integration of infant observation studies with concepts concerning interpersonal 
development. Nevertheless, it lacks two critical dimensions essential to attachment theory. 
First, it lacks a genuine longitudinal observational perspective. A great strength of attachment 
theory is its almost unique empirical handle on longitudinal and cross-generational 
predictions. Although Stern’s observations are well operationalized in terms of mother–infant 
interaction and infant development, they lack operationalization in the context of adult 
behavior, and therefore longitudinal studies based on Stern’s framework have rarely been 
attempted. Second, while Stern (1998) probably appropriately claims that schemas of ways-
of-being-with are the building blocks of IWMs, close links between the two systems have not 
yet been demonstrated. However, important pioneering work by Beatrice Beebe and her 
group (Beebe, Lachmann, & Jaffe, 1997) has drawn on this ambition. In the tradition of 
pioneers such as Stern and Emde (e.g., Emde & Spicer, 2000), this work has sought to 
demonstrate the significance of the growth of scientific understanding of early development 
for clinical and theoretical psychoanalysis. It has led to the gradual modification of the image 
of the “psychoanalytic infant” from a hypothetical creature based on speculative 
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reconstruction from adult narratives, to a picture that is constrained and moderated by actual 
systematic observations of children. 
Beebe and Lachmann’s microanalytic studies of mother–infant interactions, from as 
young as 4 months of age, provide a robust way to apply attachment thinking to 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. Video microanalysis allows for the capture of rapid and often 
very subtle communicative events that can help us to tease out the origins of communication 
disturbances in infancy. The detailed empiricism of Beebe’s observations is reminiscent of 
the complex and meticulous observational work originally undertaken by Mary Ainsworth 
(Beebe & Lachmann, 2014).  
Tronick (2003) has also deepened our understanding of the uniqueness of attachment 
relationships and proposed an important model for how these relationships increasingly 
differentiate themselves. This work has taken us beyond attachment theory’s early, reductive 
views on proximity, and has helped us to conceptualize the nuances of the mother–infant 
relationship and the mechanisms through which attachment is achieved and maintained. In 
particular, by pointing to the uniqueness of each attachment bond, Tronick’s (2008) 
contribution has challenged the view that the child’s relationship with the mother is 
paradigmatic for later relationships. At the same time, however, the model radically revised 
our understanding of how relationships do influence one another (Tronick, 2005, 2007). 
Tronick’s (1989, 2007) mutual regulation model (MRM) of infant–adult interaction 
focuses on the subtle, nonverbal, microregulatory and social-emotional processes that unfold 
in mother–infant interactions. The MRM postulates that infants have “self-organizing 
neurobehavioral capacities” and “biopsychological processes” that allow them to “organize 
behavioral states” and make “sense of themselves and their place in the world” (Tronick, 
2007, pp. 8–9). At the same time, Tronick pointed to the limits of these capacities and stated 
that they need to be supplemented by a “larger dyadic regulatory system” in which the infant 
Reconciling Psychoanalytic Ideas with Attachment Theory 
19 
 
participates with the caregiver (Tronick, 2007, p. 9). In this way Tronick brings together the 
notion of sensitivity with the overriding construct of meaning-making.   
Successful mutual regulation is achieved when an infant and caregiver together 
generate, communicate, and integrate meaningful elements of consciousness. This creates a 
synchrony in implicit relational knowing, allowing each to anticipate and “know” the moves 
of the other. This “knowing” is initially of a pattern of physiological responses or activations 
rather than of intentional states, although clearly it can be the platform for knowing of 
intention given developmental time. The parent–infant collaboration results in a singular, 
organized dyadic state that is believed to be more than the sum of its parts. This leads to what 
Tronick terms a state of “co-creativity” in which infant and caregiver shape their relationship 
through a process of mutual regulation (Tronick, 2003, p. 476).  
The focus of both Beebe’s (Beebe et al., 1997) interactive regulation model and 
Tronick’s (1989, 2007) MRM includes the “messiness” of interpersonal communications as 
well as the greater cohesion allowed through reparation and co-creativity. These models 
allow us to operationalize such psychoanalytic concepts as the holding environment 
(Winnicott, 1965) and background of safety (Sandler, 1960), and take us toward a genuinely 
relational model of change in psychoanalytic treatment. Furthermore, studies of the 
contingency between the mother’s and infant’s vocalizations can help us to predict secure 
attachment relationships (Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown, & Jasnow, 2001).   
Recent work by Mayes (e.g., Mayes & Leckman, 2007) has taken some of the ideas 
first plotted in psychoanalytic terms and powerfully worked them through an empirical, 
child-development perspective. She has been particularly notable in her use of Winnicott’s 
(1956) clinical and theoretical insights. His idea of maternal primary preoccupation and his 
thoughts on maternal care and its role in child development have, for example, been explored 
by Mayes in her study of the course of and fluctuations in early primary preoccupation 
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(Leckman & Mayes, 1999). The study found that parents’ perceptions of the maternal care 
they received during childhood predicted postpartum fluctuations in mood. Mayes and 
colleagues suggest that parents whose representations of early parenting are colored by 
perceptions and experiences of unavailable or inadequate care are less able to sustain the 
intense, adaptive preoccupied focus on their new infant without also experiencing dysphoria. 
In this model, early parenting experiences may determine the extent to which new parents 
might be vulnerable in the peripartum period (Mayes & Leckman, 2007; see Berlin, 
Lieberman, & Zeanah, Chapter, xx, this volume, for clinical applications).  
Mentalizing Theory and Attachment 
The mentalizing model is a recent psychoanalytic extension of attachment theory and 
research that claims a synergistic relationship between attachment processes and the growth 
of a child’s capacity to understand interpersonal behavior in terms of mental states (Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). This capacity is referred to as mentalizing or reflective 
functioning. Recent elaborations of this theory have pointed to the key role of attachment 
relationships in the development of the capacity for epistemic trust (see later). Both 
evolutionary considerations and experimental developmental research suggest that epistemic 
trust plays a key role in the intergenerational transmission of knowledge and in learning that 
is specific to human beings (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, in press). These new theoretical and 
empirical developments, which have emerged out of a new dialogue between attachment 
theory, the mentalizing approach, and evolutionary theory, also shed new light on the nature 
and emergence of personality disorders (PDs), as outlined below, and attest to the ongoing 
productivity of the interface between psychoanalytic ideas and attachment theory.  
Mentalizing is often simplistically understood, but research findings clearly 
demonstrate that it involves a spectrum of capacities. It is underpinned by four dimensions 
involving relatively distinct neural circuits: (a) automatic versus controlled, (b) mentalizing 
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based on external features (e.g., facial expression, posture) versus internal indicators, (c) 
mentalizing with regard to self and others, and (d) cognitive versus affective mentalizing 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2012). Effective mentalizing requires the individual to maintain a 
balance across these four dimensions. 
Over the past 25 years a systematic program of research has demonstrated that the 
capacity to mentalize emerges in the context of early attachment relationships and is a key 
determinant of self-organization and affect regulation. Specifically, studies looking at 
different ways in which caregiver mentalizing is operationalized—including prenatal 
reflective function (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 1991), child-specific reflective 
function (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005), mind-related comments 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2001; Meins et al., 2002), and a diverse range of 
other measures (Aber, Slade, Berger, Bresgi, & Kaplan, 1985; Koren-Karie, Oppenheim, 
Dolev, Sher, & Etzion-Carasso, 2002; Oppenheim, Koren-Karie, & Sagi, 2001; Solomon & 
George, 1999)—have found that each of these aspects of mentalizing capacity predicts 
attachment security in the child. Furthermore, the caregiver’s capacity to mentalize can offer 
protection from risk factors in the caregiver that are associated with generating attachment 
insecurity, such as maternal trauma and disruptive maternal behaviors. We also now know 
that the benefits of caregiver mentalizing extend beyond attachment outcomes: It is 
associated with better performance in children’s social cognition tasks (Laranjo, Bernier, 
Meins, & Carlson, 2010; Meins et al., 2002), as well as general social cognitive development 
(Meins et al., 2003). By contrast, social environments characterized by adversity in child 
development (e.g., neglect, abuse) impair the development of cognition (Ayoub et al., 2009; 
Fernald, Weber, Galasso, & Ratsifandrihamanana, 2011; Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2010; 
Rieder & Cicchetti, 1989). The mentalizing approach proposes that problems in affect 
regulation, attentional control and self-control stemming from dysfunctional attachment 
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relationships (Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, & Lyons-Ruth, 2004; Lyons-Ruth, Yellin, 
Melnick, & Atwood, 2005; Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005), as manifested 
perhaps most clearly in severe personality problems such as borderline personality disorder 
(BPD), are mediated through a failure to develop a robust mentalizing capacity (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2010).  
While the mentalization-focused model of development places strong emphasis on the 
relationship between attachment and mentalizing, this relationship is situated within a broader 
developmental approach that also emphasizes the role of gene–environment interplay (for a 
fuller discussion of this point, see Fonagy & Luyten, in press). Although the capacity to 
mentalize is not a constitutional given, it does seem to be a capacity that is partly pre-wired 
(Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010). Thus, this is not a naive environmentalist model: The 
interaction between genetic predisposition and early and later influences on the development 
of the capacity to mentalize is thought to be crucially important. 
In this section we outline the mentalizing model and show how certain observed 
associations between attachment and psychopathology can be understood in terms of the 
vicissitudes of the development of the capacity to mentalize, taking BPD as a paradigmatic 
example.  
Disordered Attachment in BPD 
Studies using both self-report and interview-based measures of attachment have 
shown that BPD is associated with increased levels of attachment insecurity (Agrawal et al., 
2004). Cross-sectional investigations show that individuals with borderline features have 
preoccupied, disorganized, and unresolved patterns of attachment (Levy, Beeney, & Temes, 
2011). A cross-sectional study looking at the attachment styles of patients with mood disorder 
and those with BPD found that although both groups showed greater preoccupation and 
fearfulness than controls, only BPD patients simultaneously showed preoccupation and 
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fearfulness. This study thus confirms the suggestion from a number of attachment theorists 
that the key marker of BPD may be a lack of any functional regulation strategy to reduce 
attachment distress (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008; Main, 2000). 
To understand these associations, we must consider the nature of early attachments. 
Our model hypothesizes that suboptimal early attachment experiences are robust predictors of 
BPD in later life, not so much because of the attachment experiences themselves, but because 
it is in the context of attachment relationships that the infant learns to understand his or her 
own emotional states, acquires the capacity for affect regulation, and discovers him/herself as 
a psychological entity through marked mirroring interactions (Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy, 
Gergely, & Target, 2007). In line with this hypothesis, Carlson and colleagues (2009) 
reported significant, although weak, correlations between borderline symptoms at 28 years of 
age and indicators of a suboptimal early environment (maltreatment, maternal hostility, 
attachment disorganization, and family stress in the first 3–4 years of life). These culminated 
in a range of social-cognitive anomalies—attentional disturbance, emotional instability, and 
relational disturbance—that were evident by 12 years of age. A path-analytic approach 
offered strong evidence that disturbances in self-representation in early adolescence mediated 
the link between disorganization of early attachment relationships and PD. 
BPD and Childhood Adversity 
The role of developmental trauma in BPD in general has been a significant focus of 
research. Among individuals with PDs, rates of childhood trauma are very high (Ball & 
Links, 2009). Compared with nonclinical adults, PD patients are four times as likely to have 
suffered early trauma (Johnson, Cohen, Brown, Smailes, & Bernstein, 1999), and the disorder 
is more consistently associated with childhood maltreatment than any other PD diagnosis 
(e.g. Baird, Veague, & Rabbitt, 2005; Battle et al., 2004; Buchheim et al., 2008). 
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A particularly impressive study following up several hundred abused and neglected 
children and matched controls into adulthood reported a 2.5-fold increase in the prevalence of 
BPD associated with abuse and neglect (Widom, Czaja, & Paris, 2009). In this prospective 
investigation of children who were identified as maltreated by child protection services, early 
neglect appeared to be the most potent risk factor for both genders, whereas physical abuse 
represented a risk only for males. A systematic review of the literature on BPD and trauma by 
Crombie and Fonagy (2013) found that generally high-quality studies across a range of 
designs and measurement methodologies converge in showing, both prospectively and 
retrospectively, that emotional neglect and abuse predict BPD symptoms and diagnosis in 
line with or in excess of the impact that can be observed to be associated with physical and 
sexual abuse. This observation supports our expectation that even in the absence of dramatic 
maltreatment, the individual’s competence to represent mental states may be undermined by 
the absence of contingent responding to their subjective experience, resulting in increased 
vulnerability for BPD. Subsequent brutality in an attachment context may then further disrupt 
mentalizing as part of an adaptive adjustment to adversity (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & 
Target, 1994; Stein, Fonagy, Ferguson, & Wisman, 2000). Hence, early emotional neglect in 
particular, rather than physical or sexual abuse as such, may predispose individuals to 
developing BPD by limiting their opportunity to acquire the capacity to mentalize and 
leaving them vulnerable to disruptions in mentalizing under the influence of later stress.  
Disruptions of the Caregiving Environment and the Development of Mentalizing 
Consistent with these claims, studies show that insecurely attached children do not 
perform as well as secure children in mentalizing tasks (e.g., de Rosnay & Harris, 2002). The 
London Parent–Child Project (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, & Holder, 1997), for instance, found 
that 82% of children who were secure with their mother in the Strange Situation passed 
Harris’ Belief-Desire-Reasoning Task at 5.5 years, compared with 50% of those who were 
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avoidant and 33% of the small number who were preoccupied. The mentalizing approach has 
emphasized the importance of secure attachment in providing a context in which the child is 
allowed to develop the ability to mentalize and regulate his/her own emotions. But even more 
importantly, in an environment that is invalidating and emotionally abusive, an insecure and 
disorganized attachment pattern is likely to develop, and this is likely to seriously hinder 
development of the capacity for mentalizing (Fonagy, 2000; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
Again, the broader context seems to be key here. Significantly, Widom et al. (2009) 
found that the impact of child abuse and neglect became nonsignificant in a regression model 
predicting BPD features when other family and lifestyle characteristics were included (e.g., 
parental substance use, employment, education level, and Axis I disorders). These authors 
concluded that maltreatment may represent a marker for family dysfunction, and that family 
dysfunction may actually be more significant in leading to a greater risk of BPD. This is 
congruent with the notion that abuse and neglect are typically part of a broader context 
characteristic of “risky families and environments” (Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002) or 
“pathogenic relational environments” (Cicchetti & Toth, 2005). A number of family-related 
factors—all likely to undermine the acquisition of mentalizing—have been reported to be 
significant predictors of BPD, including parental psychopathology, witnessing domestic 
violence in childhood, and parental imprisonment and suicide attempts (Afifi et al., 2011; 
Helgeland & Torgersen, 2004; Widom et al., 2009; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, & 
Silk, 2006). More detailed prospective studies of caregiver–child interactions are needed to 
further investigate these assumptions, but we may expect growing up in an environment of 
insecure and unpredictable attachment relationships to disrupt the acquisition of robust 
mentalizing. In this context, a recent comprehensive systematic review (Macintosh, 2013) 
identified five studies (Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy & Bateman, 2006; Fossati et al., 2009; 
Fossati, Feeney, Maffei, & Borroni, 2011; Stein & Allen, 2007) supporting the assumption 
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that impairments in mentalizing mediated the relationship between insecure attachment 
and/or adversity and adult functioning. However, more research is clearly needed in this area. 
Considered in relation to attachment, mentalizing deficits associated with childhood 
maltreatment may be a form of decoupling, inhibition, or even a phobic reaction to 
mentalizing. Various studies indeed suggest that (a) adversity may undermine cognitive 
development in general (Cicchetti, Rogosch, & Toth, 2000; Crandell & Hobson, 1999; 
Stacks, Beeghly, Partridge, & Dexter, 2011), (b) mentalizing problems as a result of 
maltreatment may reflect arousal problems associated with exposure to chronic stress (see 
Cicchetti & Walker, 2001), and (c) the child may avoid mentalizing to avoid perceiving the 
abuser’s hostile and malevolent thoughts and feelings about him/her (e.g., Fonagy, 1991; 
Goodman et al., 2010).  
Regardless of the precise nature of the impact of early adversity on mentalizing, these 
findings imply that the foundations of subjective selfhood will be less robustly established in 
those who have experienced early neglect. However, while some readers might interpret this 
approach as a deficit theory, our emphasis is upon adaptation. The specific configuration of 
mentalizing capacities characterizing individuals with BPD (and other types of 
psychopathology associated with impairments in mentalizing) may be conceived of as 
optimizing the child’s adaptation to the challenges of his/her social context (Blair & Raver, 
2012; Frankenhuis & Panchanathan, 2011; Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Clark Barrett, 
2013). Our speculation that in circumstances of neglect and/or abuse it may be preferable to 
forgo reflective considerations, particularly of the cognitions of others (Fonagy, 1991), is 
consistent with an evolutionary–developmental view that suggests that we have to study the 
likely impact for survival and the costs and benefits (to children) of developing particular 
mental capacities in particular social contexts (Belsky, 2012; Ellis et al., 2012). While the 
impairments in mentalizing that we have noted may bring benefit to the child under some 
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social conditions, in normal adult contexts they render the individual more vulnerable—even 
in the face of social adversity in adulthood. The precise nature of these impairments, research 
suggests, largely depends on individuals’ dominant secondary attachment strategies for 
dealing with experiences, which become increasingly generalized. In the next section, we 
review these strategies and their influence on mentalizing in more detail. 
Neurobiology of Stress, Attachment, and Mentalizing 
Beyond the general impact of attachment disruptions on mentalizing, secondary 
attachment strategies (deactivation or hyperactivation of the attachment system in an effort to 
cope with threats; Cassidy & Kobak, 1987) have a more specific influence on mentalizing 
and may explain individual differences in mentalizing profiles.   
Following the model outlined by Arnsten (Arnsten, Mathew, Ubriani, Taylor, & Li, 
1999) and Mayes (Mayes, 2000, 2006), we suggest that with increased arousal a switch 
occurs from cortical to subcortical systems, from controlled to automatic mentalizing, and, 
subsequently, to nonmentalizing modes. Two points are critical for understanding 
impairments in mentalizing in this context. First, owing to the neurochemical switch 
associated with escalating emotional stress, patterns of brain functioning can shift from 
flexibility to automatic functioning: that is, from relatively slow executive functions mediated 
by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to faster habitual behaviors mediated by posterior cortical 
(e.g., parietal) and subcortical (e.g., amygdala, hippocampus, and striatum) structures. At the 
same time, mentalizing seems to disappear as self-protective physical reactions (i.e., 
fight/flight/freeze) begin to dominate behavior. This has the presumed evolutionary value of 
promoting immediate adaptive responses to danger. However, in situations of interpersonal 
stress, where complex cognitive-emotional functioning (i.e., mentalizing) may be helpful, the 
switch from executive (mentalizing) to automatic (fight/flight/freeze) responses may be 
counterproductive, to say the least. We also assume, following Arnsten et al. (1999) and 
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Mayes (Mayes, 2000), that exposure to early stress and trauma can lower the threshold for 
switching, an assumption that has received considerable empirical support in the meantime. 
Second, both situational and more stable within-person variations play a role in the switch 
from more controlled to automatic mentalizing (see Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten, Fonagy, 
Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012, for a detailed discussion).  
In individuals with secure attachment, activation of the attachment system predictably 
involves a relaxation of normal strategies of interpersonal caution. There is good evidence 
that intense activation of the neurobehavioral system underpinning attachment is associated 
with deactivation of the arousal and affect-regulation systems (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; 
Luyten et al., 2012), as well as the deactivation of neurocognitive systems likely to generate 
interpersonal suspicion, that is, those systems and brain regions involved in social cognition 
or mentalizing, including the lateral PFC, medial PFC (mPFC), lateral parietal cortex, medial 
parietal cortex, medial temporal lobe, and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Bartels & Zeki, 
2000, 2004; Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009). For 
example, with increased intimacy, regions of the brain associated with reflective mentalizing 
will be deactivated—which perhaps explains the many linguistic and cultural variations of the 
popular sentiment that love is blindness. 
Moreover, as noted, the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin play key roles in two 
aspects of creating attachment relationships: (1) by activating the reward/attachment system, 
and (2) by deactivating neurobehavioral systems that are involved in mediating social 
avoidance (Bartels & Zeki, 2004). For instance, oxytocin and vasopressin have been shown to 
inhibit aversion of both female and male rodents to infant pups, as well as promoting a 
number of affiliative behaviors, including caregiving behavior (Heinrichs, von Dawans, & 
Domes, 2009; Insel & Young, 2001). Oxytocin also reduces behavioral and neuroendocrine 
responses to social stress, and seems to enable animals to overcome their natural avoidance of 
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proximity and to inhibit defensive behavior, thereby facilitating approach behavior (Simeon 
et al., 2011). Vasopressin has primarily been implicated in male-typical social behaviors, 
including aggression and pair-bond formation, and mediates anxiogenic effects (Heinrichs & 
Domes, 2008). Thus, in the context of secure attachment, activation of the attachment system 
will generate increased experience of reward, increased sensitivity to social cues, and 
decreased social avoidance, but also the potential for the reward to override lack of trust. This 
complex set of associations with social behavior may help to account for the puzzling 
combination of facilitative and inhibitory associations between attachment history and social 
cognition. For instance, in two separate imaging studies, Bartels and Zeki (2000, 2004) 
reported that the activation of areas mediating maternal and/or romantic attachments 
appeared simultaneously to suppress brain activity in several regions mediating different 
aspects of cognitive control, including those associated with making social judgments and 
mentalizing. The second set of brain areas observed to be deactivated by the activation of 
attachment concerns included the temporal poles, temporoparietal junction, amygdala, and 
mPFC—areas consistently linked to explicit and internally focused mentalizing, including 
judgments of social trustworthiness, moral judgments, Theory of Mind tasks, and attention to 
one’s own emotions. 
In contrast, studies suggest that anxious-preoccupied attachment strategies are 
associated with simultaneously lowered thresholds for attachment system activation and 
controlled mentalizing deactivation.  In these individuals, more automatic, subcortical 
systems, including the amygdala, have a lower threshold for responding to stress.   
Attachment deactivating strategies, in turn, have been shown to be associated with the 
capacity to keep systems involved in controlled mentalizing on-line for longer, including 
systems involved in judging the trustworthiness of other individuals (i.e., the “pull” 
mechanism associated with attachment; Vrticka, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & 
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Vuilleumier, 2008). Yet, whereas securely attached individuals are able to keep the controlled 
mentalizing system on-line even when stress increases, meaning that the attachment system is 
less likely to be triggered, the deactivating strategy of dismissive individuals is likely to fail 
in these circumstances. If securely attached individuals are those who are able to retain a 
relatively high activation of prefrontal areas in the presence of activation of the dopaminergic 
mesolimbic pathways (the attachment and reward system), then differences in mentalizing 
between securely attached individuals and those individuals who primarily rely on attachment 
deactivating strategies may become apparent only under increasing stress; this seems 
consistent with the findings of experimental studies (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).   
This model allows us to explain why, for instance, mentalizing deficits in BPD are 
more likely to be observed in experimental settings that trigger the attachment system, such 
as in studies collecting AAI narratives (e.g., Fonagy et al., 1996; Levinson & Fonagy, 2004), 
and also why BPD patients who mix deactivating and hyperactivating strategies, as is 
characteristic of disorganized attachment, show tendencies for both hypermentalizing and 
mentalizing failure. On the one hand, because attachment deactivating strategies are typically 
associated with minimizing and avoiding affective content, BPD patients often have a 
tendency for hypermentalizing; that is, continuing attempts to mentalize, but without 
integrating cognition and affect. On the other hand, as the use of hyperactivating strategies is 
associated with a decoupling of controlled mentalizing, this leads to failure of mentalizing as 
a result of over-reliance on modes of social cognition that antedate full mentalizing (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2006). 
We see BPD as in some ways at the opposite end of the spectrum from interpersonal 
resilience (Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 2008; Higgitt & Fonagy, 1992). Studies suggest that 
the ability to continue to mentalize even under considerable stress leads to so-called “broaden 
and build” (Fredrickson, 2001) cycles of attachment security, which reinforce feelings of 
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secure attachment, personal agency, and affect regulation (“build”) and lead one to be pulled 
into different and more adaptive environments (“broaden”) (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Congruent with these assumptions, studies on resilience have shown that positive attachment 
experiences are related to resilience in part through relationship-recruiting, that is, the 
capacity of resilient individuals to become attached to caring others (Hauser, Allen, & 
Golden, 2006). Hence, high levels of mentalizing and the associated use of security-based 
attachment strategies when faced with stress are good candidates to explain the effect of 
relationship-recruiting and resilience in the face of stress. In contrast, attachment 
hyperactivation and deactivation have been shown to limit the ability to broaden and build in 
the face of stress. Moreover, they have also been shown to inhibit other behavioral systems 
that are involved in resilience, such as exploration, affiliation, and caregiving (Insel & 
Young, 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Neumann, 2008). This may also partially explain 
these individuals’ difficulties in entering lasting relationships (including relationships with 
mental health care professionals) and the intergenerational transmission of borderline 
pathology.  
To summarize, we may envisage three types of association between aspects of 
mentalizing and attachment. These are created by (a) attachment relationships based upon 
intense romantic or maternal love, (b) attachment relationships based upon threat/fear, and (c) 
secure and predictable attachment relationships. Although any given attachment relationship 
may have features of each of these three types, they are important to distinguish, as the 
relationship between attachment activation and mentalizing may differ considerably 
depending on which feature is activated within an attachment relationship. (a) Mediated by 
dopaminergic structures of the reward system in the presence of oxytocin and vasopressin, 
the love-related activation of the attachment system can inhibit the neural systems that 
underpin the generation of negative affect. (b) Threat-related activation of the attachment 
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system (e.g., triggered by perceived threat, loss, or harm) may also evoke intense arousal and 
overwhelming negative affect, bringing about an activation of posterior cortical and 
subcortical areas and switching off frontal cortical activity, including mentalizing (Arnsten et 
al., 1999; Arnsten, 1998; Mayes, 2000). (c) Meanwhile, a secure and predictable attachment 
relationship may be most effective in pre-empting threat, which possibly reduces the need for 
frequent activation of the attachment system. 
Attachment, Mentalizing, and Epistemic Trust 
Recent elaborations of thinking about mentalizing have pointed to a further important 
function of attachment relationships: the development of epistemic trust, enabling social 
learning in a constantly changing environment (Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Fonagy et al., in 
press). 
As we have seen, there is now considerable evidence that the caregiver’s capacity to 
mentalize predicts secure attachment in the child. This raises the related question: How does 
the child learn from their caregiver’s behavior? This question has powerful ramifications for 
our understanding of human social development. We have argued elsewhere (Fonagy et al., in 
press), based on both evolutionary findings and theory (Sperber et al., 2010; Wilson & 
Sperber, 2012) as well as experimental developmental research (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009), 
that secure attachment experiences not only pave the way for the acquisition of mentalizing, 
but also, potentially more generally, for the formation of epistemic trust, that is, an 
individual’s willingness to consider another person’s communication of new knowledge as 
trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant to the self. As noted, these theoretical developments 
promise to lead to major changes in our views concerning the importance of attachment 
relationships in human development. 
Csibra and Gergely’s theory of natural pedagogy (ToNP) (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) 
has offered a compelling empirically based model to explain how attachment history can 
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create distinct types of epistemic states. ToNP is based on research suggesting a human-
specific, cue-driven social cognitive adaptation of mutual design dedicated to ensuring the 
most effective and efficient transfer of culturally relevant knowledge. This fast route to 
transmit knowledge is needed in humans as most of our knowledge about the world is 
cognitively opaque.  Csibra and Gergely use an idea first discussed by Bertrand Russell 
(1940), but extensively used by Sperber and Wilson (1995), suggesting that certain signals 
(ostensive cues) are employed by an agent to indicate their intent to communicate to the 
addressee. These cues may also serve to counteract natural epistemic vigilance (an adaptive 
self-protection against potentially damaging, deceptive, or inaccurate information). The 
ToNP model claims that ostensive cues generate a particular attentional state in which natural 
disbelief is temporarily suspended and the addressee feels that the communication contains 
information specifically relevant to them, which should be remembered and encoded as 
knowledge that is generally relevant to social situations. The information can be laid down 
and used as part of procedural and semantic memory, not uniquely or primarily episodic 
memory. 
Research in this context suggests that a securely attached child is more likely to feel 
that the caregiver is a reliable source of knowledge because the predictors of secure 
attachment relationships are in essence also ostensive communication cues. A sensitive 
caregiver’s consistent emotional responses to the child are communicated via the caregiver’s 
ostensive cues, which include eye contact, turn-taking, contingent reactivity, and the use of a 
special tone, all of which appear to trigger a special mode of learning in the infant. The 
caregiver’s marked mirroring of the infant’s emotional expression which underpins the 
development of emotion understanding can be seen as ostensive in nature, signaling the 
relevance of the caregiver’s display to the infant’s accumulating knowledge base about their 
own subjective experience (Fonagy et al., 2007). 
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In brief, ostensive cues trigger epistemic trust and simultaneously engender secure 
parent–child attachment (Fonagy et al., 2007). They set aside the biological protection 
provided by epistemic vigilance. They open a channel of information exchange about the 
social and personally relevant world (an “epistemic superhighway”) that allows us to acquire 
new knowledge rapidly. The knowledge transmitted is generalized beyond the specific 
experience in which it is acquired, remembered and encoded with the authority but not the 
person of the communicator. Epistemic trust is necessary to allow us to change our position 
safely in the light of new experiences. 
Several fascinating developmental experiments summarized by Csibra and Gergely 
(2009) offer compelling evidence from infancy for the power of this dialogic learning 
process. In one simple demonstration, 6-month-old infants were shown to follow an agent’s 
gaze-shift selectively to an object only if it had been preceded either by eye contact with the 
infant or by infant-directed speech (Senju & Csibra, 2008).  Shared attention with an agent is 
triggered by the infant experiencing the agent’s interest. The interest triggers the infant’s 
expectation (epistemic trust) that there may be something relevant for the infant to learn.  
A second study employing an automated eye-tracker used an infant-induced 
contingent reactivity paradigm (Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, & Csibra, 2011). During the 
familiarization phase, 8-month-old infants observed a display where five unfamiliar animated 
objects (looking more like jugs or kettles than anything else) were displayed. Four of these, in 
the four corners of the display, moved unpredictably. The object at the center acted 
differently in two conditions.  In the interactive condition, whenever the infant’s gaze 
wandered towards the object, it would apparently respond to the infant’s gaze with 
movements and sound. In the control condition, the central object would move a comparable 
amount but this would be independent of the infant’s gaze. In the test phase, only three 
objects were present. The central object in this phase turned toward either the left or the right 
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object. It should be noted that although none of the five jug-like objects had eyes, they had a 
clear, unequivocal front signaled by a pointed “hat” and an elongated “nose” (somewhat 
reminiscent of a kettle with an upturned beak). The 8-month-olds in the interactive condition 
detected the contingent activity of the central object and looked at the object it turned toward 
(i.e., followed its “gaze”) far more. In the noncontingent control condition, the infants did not 
look for longer, more frequently, or more promptly at the object that the central object turned 
toward. It seems that the contingent reactivity of this nonhuman and somewhat bizarre object 
was sufficient to influence the infant’s orientation. The study is important in showing that it is 
the experience of response-induced contingencies that creates epistemic trust and elicits a 
“joint attention response.” 
As noted, studies in this context emphasize the key importance of attachment history. 
For example, in a longitudinal study of attachment, 147 children assessed for attachment in 
infancy were tested twice for epistemic trust at the ages of 50 and 61 months (Corriveau et 
al., 2009). In this study, the child’s mother and a stranger made conflicting claims to a child 
concerning (a) the name of a novel object, (b) the name of a hybrid animal made up of 50% 
of each of two animals (e.g., an image made up of 50% rabbit and 50% squirrel; the mother 
might call it a squirrel, while the stranger says it is a rabbit), and (c) the name of a hybrid 
animal made up of 75% of one animal and 25% of another. In the last case it was always the 
mother who made the improbable claim (e.g., that a picture made up of 75% bird and 25% 
fish was a fish), while the stranger gave the more likely answer (in this example, “bird”). The 
nature of a child’s attachment relationship powerfully conditioned the child’s trust in the 
information imparted by the attachment figure (mother) and others (strangers) as informants. 
Children who were securely attached in infancy displayed a flexible strategy, showing a 
preference toward accepting claims made by their mother when appropriate. Insecure-
avoidant children withheld trust in their mother, preferring to attend to information from the 
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stranger, while insecure-resistant children withheld trust in the stranger even when their 
mother made improbable claims. Children with insecure-disorganized histories evidenced 
what we may call epistemic hypervigilance; they appeared to regard both sources of 
information with suspicion. 
Hence, security of attachment, rooted in a history of feeling recognized, appears to 
increase the likelihood of trust in the source of communication when it is reasonably credible. 
Yet a secure attachment history also generates confidence in one’s own experience and belief 
and empowers one’s (i.e., the child’s) judgment. A history of attachment avoidance may 
generate epistemic mistrust, while anxious attachment creates epistemic uncertainty through 
overreliance on the views of the attachment figure. Disorganized attachment, rooted in a 
history of chronic misattunement, unsurprisingly can create mistrust of both the attachment 
figure and strangers as a source of information. It is the unresolvable question of “Who can I 
trust?” that might contribute to epistemic hypervigilance in a child with a history of 
disorganized attachment.   
Here, attachment researchers are faced with a conundrum. While these studies suggest 
that attachment may be a key mechanism for the mediation of epistemic trust, the theoretical 
formulations reviewed suggest that it may be secondary to an underlying biological process 
preserved by evolution. We have seen that stimuli such as the bizarre kettle-shaped object in 
the study described earlier are capable of at least momentarily triggering the same category of 
response as human beings. In other words, secure attachment is not likely to be a necessary 
condition for generating epistemic trust but it may be sufficient, and perhaps the most 
pervasive in early childhood because it is a highly evolutionarily effective indicator of 
trustworthiness.   
Looked at from a distance, microanalytic (e.g., Beebe et al., 2010) and more global 
(e.g., DeWolf & van IJzendoorn, 1997; Isabella, Belsky, & von Eye, 1989; Kiser, Bates, 
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Maslin, & Bayles, 1986; Mills-Koonce et al., 2007) ratings of sensitive caregiving can be 
seen as in essence recognizing the child’s agentive self. It is this recognition that we believe 
offers the cognitive advantage to secure attachment, which has been fairly consistently noted, 
although not, to our knowledge, commonly studied (e.g., Crandell & Hobson, 1999; Jacobsen 
& Hofmann, 1997; Moss, Rousseau, Parent, St.-Laurent, & Saintong, 1998) and contributes 
to the cognitive disadvantage of developmental adversity (Ayoub et al., 2009; Fernald et al., 
2011; Goodman et al., 2010; Rieder & Cicchetti, 1989). We believe that through the down-
regulation of affect triggered by proximity-seeking in the distressed infant, attachment not 
only establishes a lasting bond, but also opens a channel for information to be used for the 
transfer of knowledge between the generations.   
Attachment insecurity is likely to be associated with a greater likelihood of cognitive 
closure, a lower tolerance for ambiguity, and a more pronounced tendency for dogmatic 
thinking (Mikulincer, 1997). Saving intellectual effort and adopting stereotypes is also more 
likely in individuals whose attachment is insecure (Mikulincer, 1997). The same 
predisposition to knowledge inflexibility is revealed by the tendency of insecure individuals 
to make judgments on the basis of early information and to pay insufficient heed to 
subsequent data even if it is incompatible with the configuration first created (Green-
Hennessy & Reis, 1998; Mikulincer, 1997). Insecure individuals, who fear the loss of 
attachment figures, also anxiously hold on to their initial constructions. Kruglanski 
(Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008) proposed the 
concept of epistemic freezing, characterized by a tendency to defend existing knowledge 
structures, even when they are incorrect or misleading (see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Returning to the earlier theme of seeing adversity as leading not to deficit but rather to 
a superior adaptation to challenging environments (Frankenhuis et al., 2013), we may see 
such a defensive strategy as adaptive if an individual’s self-esteem is vulnerable. Cognitive 
Reconciling Psychoanalytic Ideas with Attachment Theory 
38 
 
closure, dogmatism, and conservatism may simply be strategies to create a bulwark to 
safeguard an inadequately individuated self (Bowlby, 1980). By contrast, the greater 
confidence of secure individuals that they will be able to recover from dysregulation also 
enables them to be less defensive and more able to open their minds to information that may 
challenge their assumptions. 
Mikulincer (1997) suggested that insecure individuals were more readily threatened 
by information that challenged their knowledge structures because of the vulnerability of 
their sense of self, and vulnerability in particular to being emotionally overwhelmed. If 
emotional dysregulation is experienced as a real and imminent threat, they may opt for 
knowledge stability, as it temporarily serves to down-regulate arousal. Such individuals are 
less likely to revise their knowledge in the face of information that challenges their 
assumptions (Green-Hennessy & Reis, 1998; Green & Campbell, 2000; Mikulincer, 1997; 
Mikulincer & Arad, 1999) as if they not only had less confidence in the robustness of their 
bond to their attachment figure, but also feared the loss of epistemic trust. In sum, we assume 
that the epistemic superhighway provided to us by evolution in order for us to learn from 
experience is partially closed to those whose attachment to their caregiver is insecure.  
Anomalies of early parent–infant communication that predict attachment 
disorganization and later personality pathology (e.g., Lyons-Ruth, Bureau, Holmes, 
Easterbrooks, & Brooks, 2013) may be, from this perspective, understood as cases of misuse 
of ostensive cueing. By “misuse of ostensive cueing” we mean using cues to lead the infant to 
anticipate personally relevant, generalizable knowledge through a kind of pseudo-sensitivity 
followed by the transmission of disruptive and even destructive knowledge. From the 
perspective of epistemic trust as the mediator of culture, and its key underlying engine for 
progression, we see the destruction of trust in social knowledge as a key mechanism in 
pathological personality development. Developmental adversity, perhaps most deeply 
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attachment trauma (Allen, 2012, 2013), may trigger a profound destruction of trust. The 
absence of epistemic trust generates an apparent rigidity in the eyes of the communicator 
who, in accordance with the principles of theoretical rationality, expects the recipient to 
modify their behavior on the basis of the information they have received and apparently 
understood. But in the absence of trust the capacity for change is absent. The information 
presented is not used to update the individual’s social understanding. In terms of the ToNP 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009) the person has (temporarily) lost the capacity for learning. From a 
therapist’s standpoint, he or she has become “hard to reach” and interpersonally inaccessible. 
According to the evolutionary perspective we are advancing, a particular attachment 
style should be seen less as a measure of the extent to which the caregiver succeeded in 
generating infant attachment security but, more broadly, as learning of the most appropriate 
method for the child’s social survival in a complex interpersonal world (Belsky, 2006; Ein-
Dor, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2011; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Simpson & Belsky, 2008). An 
avoidant/dismissive model of attachment might be more protective in certain environments 
than a secure one. Similarly, the anxious/preoccupied style may be an effective means of 
ensuring a child learns to effectively harness interpersonal attention and resources in a 
context of resource uncertainty. Even serious PDs such as BPD, while conspicuously 
dysfunctional in our normative social setting, may have adaptive benefits for individuals 
living in an emergency milieu characterized by high levels of interpersonal violence, where 
there is a need for extreme vigilance on issues of self-protection and where there is 
significant benefit in being able to form intense emotional relationships, which might elicit 
critical protection or resource supply very quickly. The mentalizing strengths that have been 
noted in many individuals with BPD—a tendency to be able to make quick inferences of 
other people’s mental states on the basis of their visual and emotional cues, a hypersensitivity 
to facial expressions, hyper-reactivity to positive and emotional stimuli—are all suggestive of 
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a mentalizing profile that may be an adaptation to functioning in a threatening or high-risk 
environment. 
The Future of Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis 
Despite the limitations of attachment theory, it is clear that the attachment relationship 
provides the context in which we learn to make sense of ourselves and others, or, to use the 
language of psychoanalysis, in which we create our internal world. Yet, we contend that the 
future of attachment theory lies in developing our understanding of the relationship of 
attachment and mentalizing.  
The mentalizing construct bridges the gap between psychodynamic and attachment 
models by focusing on the relationship of attachment processes and the growth of the child’s 
sense of self and its capacity to comprehend the mental states of others. The future clinical 
importance of attachment lies in understanding how mentalizing difficulties, impairments and 
imbalances are generated and how they can be alleviated. Mentalizing also provides a broader 
developmental model within which we can reconsider and accommodate the developmental 
challenges and themes traditionally emphasized within psychoanalytic thinking: the ways in 
which individuals differently respond to the developmental, environmental, and instinctual 
challenges posed by sexuality and aggression, and cope with these challenges in a complex 
social world. Any genuinely convincing developmental understanding of the ways in which 
the emotional environment may affect the mind in infancy and childhood must accommodate 
the reality of evolutionarily driven adaptiveness. We postulate that mentalizing provides the 
missing link in understanding the evolutionary mechanism at work in the transmission of 
attachment. This broader evolutionary perspective, rather than creating a reflexive, flatly 
Pavlovian model for human development, allows us to appreciate the richness of human 
subjectivity through a theory that accommodates the complex mix of factors that makes us 
who we are: that is, the early emotional environment, genes, and the barrage of wider social 
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pressures that each individual learns to interpret and respond to in particular ways depending 
on their epistemic history and mentalizing capacities.  
At one level, our views on the relationship between attachment, mentalizing, and 
epistemic trust may appear to downplay the clinical significance of attachment. However, we 
would argue that attachment thinking remains fundamental to understanding the mechanism 
by means of which mentalizing and epistemic trust are made possible. From the outset, the 
most effective way an infant is first mentalized and first able to develop epistemic trust is in 
the context of a secure attachment relationship. Similarly, it is only in the context of stable 
attachment relationships, and then within the wider social environment, that mentalizing can 
be developed and epistemic hypervigilance can safely be relaxed. According to this thinking, 
as humans evolved greater social complexity, the attachment relationship became coaxial 
with the transmission of other, more species-specific social-cognitive processes, such as 
mentalizing and the promotion of natural pedagogy.  
This latest elaboration of thinking in relation to attachment takes us back to one of 
Bowlby’s original intentions in the formulation of attachment theory: making sense of 
emotional development and psychopathology in an evolutionary context. Psychoanalytic 
thinking and psychology more broadly have been criticized for failing to take into account  
the impact of the socioeconomic environment on the individual psyche (Fonagy, Target, & 
Gergely, 2006). We can no longer neglect this influence. For instance, there is accumulating 
evidence that increasing levels of social inequality are connected with an increased 
prevalence of BPD (Grant et al., 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). If we consider that the 
evolutionary drive behind mentalizing was to enable our survival in increasingly complex 
social situations involving matters of hierarchy, cooperation, exclusion, and inclusion, it 
makes eminent sense that representations of ourselves and those around us should calibrate 
the extent to which we are experiencing social isolation, alienation, or inferiority. 
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Psychological resilience enables the individual to resist these pressures to some degree; 
individuals with BPD are often conspicuously reactive to such pressures—to be wholly 
impervious to their effects suggests mentalizing impairments of a different nature altogether. 
Both extremes, however, derive from an inability to absorb information from the social 
environment in a way that is compatible with the construction of a normatively coherent 
sense of self.  
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